It should also be noted that the historical roots of the TNI in KNIL, PETA, and local laskars are the among the major reasons why the TNI was factionalized in the beginning of the post-Independence period. It should also be noted that, as history have shown us, the very first act of military insubordination in July 1946 was caused by civilian weakness and intervention. The more popularly known episode of 17 October 1952 should also be seen in this light of civilian intervention into military affairs.

My point is this Beny, it takes two hands to clap. Yes, the military had ventured in politics and business which led to their ‘decay’, but the civilians are also to blame in this regard. It should also be noted in this case that dwi-fungsi as it was originally conceived by Nasution was meant to be ‘temporary’. In fact Nasution later became dwi-fungsi’s most staunch critic. This relates to another fact regarding the TNI, they should not be considered as a ‘total’ and monolith institution. Cleavages and factions will always exists within the TNI due to their institutional fault lines (This is actually what I’m working on for my thesis, so I will let you know later on how this hypothesis went ^_^).

In regards to military ‘decay’ due to their political and business roles, it should be noted that military intervention happened not only because of military’s self-centered greed, but also due to civilian incompetence and political opportunity which arise throughout our nation’s history.

Look at the post-Suharto military role. It was the civilian politicians that kept dragging the military back into politics, while at the same time military officers (mostly retired ones) are also increasingly participating in local politics and political parties. A friend of mine who worked with Imparsial told me that military officers told him that civilian invitations to politics is like a ‘wedding invitation’ — it’s not polite to refuse!

At the end, I do agree that normatively speaking, the military as an institution, should have apologized for their wrongdoing in the past. Wiranto did this in 1999/2000 regarding the case of Aceh. But apologies won’t suffice, instead, a complete historical reconstruction and disclosure of facts are required. This of course is another set of problems. Problems that could cause serious civil-military conflict, and when this kind of conflict escalates, usually the minorities pay (think back to the days of 1965, 1998, and Ambon).

This is why my approach on military reform has been a departure from the usual approach of asking radical and quick results. No one has ever thought about what’s gonna happen in the next 20-25 years, and this is why I’m taking military education is my approach.

Meanwhile, yes, I have read Coen Pontoh’s book. It’s a pretty good investigatory book on the military, although I must add that nothing he wrote is entirely new in terms of facts as scholars working on Indonesian military have wrote about it decades ago, and some of its parts are I think not exactly a scholarly work. But then again, I don’t think the book is meant for an academic audience, and I do respect him personally for what he went through under Suharto.

Just a note, if you happened to have a free time, try to read a book by Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (Routledge, 2003). He wrote a chapter on military approach to the issue of human rights violations that I think is very well written and shows how there is no ‘unified’ military approach to key issues.

Sorry for the typo. =) [wrote the comment after I got out of bed this morning]

My point is this Beny, it takes two hands to clap. Yes, the military had ventured in politics and business which led to their ‘decay’, but the civilians are also to blame in this regard. It should also be noted in this case that dwi-fungsi as it was originally conceived by Nasution was meant to be ‘temporary’. In fact Nasution later became dwi-fungsi’s most staunch critic. This relates to another fact regarding the TNI, they should be considered to be a ‘total’ and monolith institution. Cleavages and factions will always exists within the TNI due to their institutional fault lines (This is actually what I’m working on for my thesis, so I will let you know later on how this hypothesis went ^_^).

So in regards to military decay due to their political and business roles, it should be noted that military intervention happened due to not only because of military’s self-centered greed, but civilian incompetence and political opportunity also arise throughout our nation’s history. Look at the post-Suharto military role. It was the civilian politicians that kept dragging the military back into politics, while at the same time military officers (mostly retired ones) are also increasingly participating in local politics and political parties. A friends of mine who worked with Imparsial told me that military officers told him that civilian invitations to politics is like a ‘wedding invitation’ — it’s not polite to refuse.

At the end, I do agree that normatively speaking, the military as an institution, should have apologized for their wrongdoing in the past. Wiranto did this in 1999/2000 regarding the case of Aceh. But apologies won’t suffice, a complete historical reconstruction and disclosure of facts are of course required. This of course if another set of problems. Problems that could cause serious civil-military conflict, and when this kind of conflict escalates, usually the minorities pay. This is why my approach on military reform has been a departure from the usual approach of asking radical and quick results. No one has ever thought about what’s gonna happen in the next 20-25 years, and this is why I’m taking military education is my approach.

Yes, I have read Coen Pontoh’s book. It’s a pretty good investigatory book on the military, although I must add that nothing he wrote is entirely new in terms of facts as scholars working on Indonesian military have wrote about it decades ago, and some of its parts are I think not exactly a scholarly work. But then again, I don’t think the book is meant for an academic audience, and I do respect him personally for what he went through under Suharto.

Just a note, if you happened to have a free time, try to read a book by Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (Routledge, 2003). He wrote a chapter on military approach to the issue of human rights violations that I think is very well written and shows how there is no ‘unified’ military approach to key issues.

As we know, in its development, TNI adopted “dwi fungsi” which led to political decay in TNI institution. Coen Husain Pontoh elaborates this clearly in his book “TNI Bukan Tentara Rakyat.”

Now, TNI has started new role in Indonesia, however in line with your opinion, TNI will never be considered as a professional military institution if they do not admit and apology their wrong doing in past human rights abuses.