Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia

Image source: kaskus.us

by Evan A. Laksmana

Is democracy hurting Indonesia’s defense? One cannot but ponder this unspoken, yet often privately asked, question heard recently in a public discussion organized by noted military watchdog the Pro-Patria Institute.

While the forum was meant to launch the institute’s latest recommendations on national security, discussions during the Q&A session touched on the “excesses” of democracy and how it has complicated, if not undermined, the Indonesian Military’s (TNI) efforts to strengthen national defense. Read the rest of this entry »

Image source: detik.com

by Evan A. Laksmana

On Oct. 5, the Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrated its 64th anniversary amid tough times. Domestically, Indonesia’s recurring natural disasters in the past five years have kept the TNI fully-occupied. A string of deadly military accidents and recurrent drops in defense budgets have also made things more difficult.

Internationally, the rise of low-intensity conflicts across the globe and rising pressure on overburdened US forces has seen a growing demand for TNI participation in international peacekeeping forces. More importantly, regional tensions still simmer beneath the surface, at a time when the military balance of power is not in our favor. Read the rest of this entry »

Image source: kesbangpapua.com

by Evan A. Laksmana

Is Indonesia rising in global politics? Many seem to think so, especially considering its democratic success story, continued economic growth and increasing global profile and influence in a wide range of issues, from human rights to trade and climate change.

Most recently, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was at the G20 Leaders Summit in Pittsburgh this week to voice not just Indonesia’s interests, but also the concerns of the Muslim world and developing nations.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s standing in Southeast Asia also appears unshaken. In fact, when the US signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in late July, some speculated that the move was meant to support Indonesia’s regional role rather than to benefit the whole region. Read the rest of this entry »

Image source: mediaindonesia.com

by Evan A. Laksmana

Following public debates about how to best tackle terrorism in Indonesia, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recently stated that it is perfectly normal for the Indonesian Military (TNI) to engage in fighting terrorism – which was not only mandated by law, but also apparently by other countries that are doing the same thing.

Although his last point may seem bizarre to some, pundits argue that as long as proper specific regulations are issued and there is close public scrutiny, the TNI could play a role in combating terrorism.

However, these arguments overlook the potential long-term detrimental effect of fighting terrorism – which in our case is historically homegrown despite of its global links – to our military effectiveness. Read the rest of this entry »

By Evan A. Laksmana

Amidst all the gung-ho following the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott bombings and the aftermath of the general elections, one could easily forget that the controversial state secrecy bill is being discussed and could soon be passed into law.

Despite heavy criticism claiming the bill would turn back the clock on democratic freedom and accountability, defense officials claim there is nothing to worry about as the bill is meant to protect strategic state information — which was true of the very first draft initially set to protect specific defense information, but not of the current draft that covers the protection of information from other government agencies and ministries.

Oddly, although skeptics argue the bill will ultimately kill our democracy, very few, if any, have pointed out the long term implications of the bill to the military itself. Read the rest of this entry »

By Jennie S. Bev

As part of international efforts to commemorate the Rwandan genocide, a New York-based group is calling for the United Nations to declare April as Genocide Prevention Month. Here at home, next month will bring the 11th anniversary of the Jakarta Riots in May 1998. Crimes against humanity occur every day around the world, and we need to remind ourselves of the root causes of such problems and consider ways to work on solutions.

Let me begin with myself. Being born a female of a minority ethnic group and a member of a minority religious group in Indonesia has put me in the “triple minority” category. While Indonesia’s population has almost equal numbers of males and females, the latter are still considered to be a minority due to their marginalization in civic and political spheres despite some recent symbolic advancements, such as a quota in the legislature. Read the rest of this entry »

Image sources: www.librarything.com and news.harvard.edu

By Evan A. Laksmana

“Clausewitz does not say much about civil-military relations in On War. Where he does address the subject, [he] is not talking about not politicians or civilians, per se.”Antulio J. Echevarria1

“Clausewitz did write a lot about civil-military relations. Even in On War.” Peter Paret2

“Clausewitz did NOT write about civil-military relations, and… There is a silence in On War, except to tell us that war is the servant and ‘Politik’ is the master.”Colin S. Gray3 Read the rest of this entry »

Image source: nirwansyahputra.wordpress.com

By Evan A. Laksmana

Last Friday, President Yudhoyono, while officiating the latest war monuments in Jakarta, asked that all of us cherish and reflect on Indonesia’s military history, reminding us that while we may prefer “soft power”, we should also be “ready for war”.

Here, the three monuments were meant to commemorate our “struggles” with Malaysia, East Timor and the Dutch. Read the rest of this entry »

Image source: daylife.com

Evan A. Laksmana

Vice President Jusuf Kalla remarked during the recent IndoDefence Expo 2008 that the strengthening of Indonesia’s defense sector by prioritizing operational readiness and the main weapons system remains a national imperative.

This statement, however, does not explicitly acknowledge the underlying problem of an underfunded military. The possible takeover of the Indonesian Military (TNI) businesses and the aging weaponry displayed during the Marine Corps anniversary recently are examples of how crucial the insufficient defense budget is.

Are we simply cursed with an everlasting underfunded military?

Since its inception during the Independence War, the military has never had adequate funding from the government, even during the heyday of Sukarno and Soeharto.

Today, although enjoying a much larger defense budget than before, defense officials claim the government is only funding around 30 percent of its current needs.

The debate surrounding this claim notwithstanding, the problem of defense budgeting is about many inter-related issues, including the TNI’s business activities, the lack of transparency and accountability in defense management, doctrinal stagnation and the financial capacity of the central government.

The complexities attached to each issue seem to lead to a “fatalistic” argument that the problem of defense budgeting will always persist.

The possible long-term solution to this age-old conundrum actually lies not in Jakarta, but all the way over in Magelang, at the Military Academy.

In hindsight, we could begin by looking at the fact that the largest portion of Indonesia’s military budget goes to personnel salaries.

Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani argued in a paper published last year that personnel costs account for 45 percent of the total defense outlay in 2007, or around Rp 14.6 trillion, to support more than 437,000 troops and civilians.

Clearly the answer here is not to simply cut back the personnel in one go. This certainly would cause major national instability if soldiers and bureaucrats were faced with possible sudden unemployment. This much history has taught us.

Instead, the long-term solution we might want to consider here is the revamping and tightening of the TNI’s recruitment policies at the academy level.

Such recruitment reform at the academy level could pave the way in the future to cut personnel defense spending gradually in the long run (quantitatively), while increasing the pay scale of soldiers and officers to a sufficient level (qualitatively).

More importantly, however, this could help solve the problem of “the inflation of generals” and promotional logjam where, to put it crudely, there are many officers, but few positions available.

Scholars argued that this promotional logjam began to surface during the late Soeharto and early reformasi periods when there was an increasing frequency of massive personnel reshuffles while the tenure of military commands was, in many instances, decreasing.

This was seen as a consequence of the increasing size of the officer corps by leaps and bounds in the 1960s through 1970s.

From the 59 cadets who graduated in the first class in 1960, the military academy later graduated 433 cadets in 1965. Later on, the number dropped to 85 graduates in 1976 only to rise again to 102 in 1980 and eventually 281 in 1991 — resulting in an overall average of around 250 cadets per year.

The increasing size of the officer corps along with the domination of certain classes that held back succeeding classes have been argued by scholars to have contributed not only to a massive personnel reshuffle, but also to intense rivalry and feuds.

Especially amid the increasingly competitive promotional space as envisaged by the late Gen. Benny Moerdani, some officers with political connections back then could easily rise through the ranks.

During the New Order, it seems plausible to argue that the size of the officer corps was not a problem as ABRI’s (as the TNI was known during Soeharto’s era) “dual function” (dwifungsi) and secondment of officers to civilian positions (kekaryaan) could provide additional billets for middle and high-ranking officers.

Moreover, while personnel, budgetary and even perhaps political considerations may have guided decisions about cadet intake, the idea during the 1960s of developing a modern military academy and consolidating military education should also be factored in.

Is this still the case today? In late October this year, the Military Academy inducted 531 cadets, with 304 for the Army, 127 for the Navy and 100 for the Air Force.

In the absence of kekaryaan and dwifungsi, as well as the shrinking number of posts available to officers in the post-Soeharto bureaucracy, should we not ask why the number of cadets inducted this year is higher than average?

Finally, by reforming recruitment policies, we could not only have a more efficient and well-paid military force, but we could also increase the quality of Indonesia’s future military leaders.

Political scholar Sukardi Rinakit has shown that there has been a decline in the quality of the officer corps as younger officers today were only average students in high school with an average grade of 6.5, compared with the high-quality students in the early 1970s and 1980s, whose average grade was 8.0. This, he argued, could make future military leaders more aggressive and less open-minded.

This argument might put too much emphasis on the significance of intellectual acuity and neglect leadership and other qualities, but an increasingly complex security environment coupled with a hardly breathing domestic defense establishment will require us to eventually incorporate the idea of a “soldier scholar” into our lexicon.

In other words, the challenge of repositioning the military to tackle the increasingly complex security environment in an even more complex democratic setting would at the very least require a mind at work.

____
The writer is a research analyst at the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article was published by The Jakarta Post.

Sumber gambar dan artikel: ranesi.nl

Junito Drias

(Beberapa waktu yang lalu saya menerima email dari seorang aktivis yang merupakan sahabat saya, Albertus Suryo Wicaksono dari Kasut Perdamaian. Isi email itu mendiskusikan perkembangan para keluarga dan korban G30S (Gerakan 30 September 1965) dan artikel di bawah. Memang harus diakui bahwa perjuangan menempatkan korban kepada posisi sebagaimana layaknya manusia penuh dengan tantangan dan bukanlah hal yang gampang. Sejak “1965 Incident Road Show in the United States” yang kami adakan tahun lalu, para korban dan kelaurga belum mendapatkan perlakuan yang selayaknya. — Beni Bevly)

Proses penyiksaan dan pembunuhan para jenderal merupakan satu dari sekian adegan mengerikan film Indonesia: Pengkhianatan G 30 S PKI. Dalam cuplikan diperlihatkan para petinggi angkatan darat ditusuk-tusuk, disayat-sayat mukanya, dihajar dengan kayu, matanya dicongkel dan dipotong penisnya. Sejak tahun 1984, film berdasar kejadian 30 September 1965 tersebut menjadi suguhan wajib, dan baru berhenti 15 tahun kemudian, setelah Soeharto jatuh dari kursi kepresidenan Indonesia. Sesudahnya, sejumlah pemerhati sejarah dan aktivis hak-hak azasi manusia, mengeluarkan hasil penelitian bahwa isi sajian sinema tersebut tidak benar.

Pengkhianatan G30SDokumen hasil otopsi mencatat para jenderal tidak dicongkel matanya, ataupun dipotong alat kelaminnya. Sumber lain menyebutkan, sama sekali tidak ditemukan tanda-tanda penyiksaan kecuali luka tembak dan bekas popor senapan. Demikian juga soal keterlibatan sayap perempuan Partai Komunis Indonesia, Gerwani, di tempat kejadian. Saksi mata menyatakan tidak melihat warga sipil. Semuanya militer.

Dari semua dusta, menurut Budi Irawanto, pengajar Semiotika Film di FISIPOL Universitas Gadjah Mada, paling parah adalah penggambaran komunis sebagai setan jahanam.

“Ada imej penyerangan orang-orang PKI ke sebuah langgar atau masjid kecil di Kanigoro Blitar. Seolah-olah mereka ateis dan anti agama. Upaya pengiblisan PKI termasuk terhadap aktivis perempuan yang digambarkan sangat haus darah. Dipropagandakan sampai memutilasi genetalia para jenderal. Ini cara memojokkan gerakan perempuan. Gerwani adalah gerakan perempuan di Indonesia yang cukup progresif, menentang poligami, memperjuangkan hak-hak perempuan.”

Bangun opini

Propaganda-propaganda sendiri dimulai jauh sebelum film dibuat. Misalnya, pidato Soeharto tanggal 4 Oktober 1965, berusaha membangun opini keterlibatan organisasi komunis Indonesia.

“Kita bersama-sama dengan mata kepala masing-masing telah menyaksikan suatu pembongkaran dari penanaman enam jenderal dan perwira utama dalam satu lubang sumur lama. Jenderal dan perwira kita menjadi korban daripada tindakan biadab dari petualang yang dinamakan Gerakan 30 September. Kalau kita melihat tempat ini adalah Lubang Buaya, dekat dengan sumur ini telah menjadi pusat latihan daripada sukarelawan dan sukarelawati, para anggota-anggota Pemuda Rakyat dan Gerwani…”

Ucapan Soeharto, kala itu berpangkat Mayor Jenderal, diikuti kebohongan publik lain. Harian Angkatan Bersenjata dan Berita Yudha mempublikasikan laporan tidak berdasar tentang kekejaman dan keterlibatan Partai Komunis Indonesia. Sementara fakta bahwa Letnan Kolonel Untung, komandan gerakan 30 September tersebut, ternyata dekat dengan Soeharto, tidak muncul. Yang menonjol justru persepsi Soeharto sebagai pahlawan.

Tak lama kemudian, penangkapan-penangkapan dan pembredelan media berhaluan kiri mulai dilakukan. Anggota organisasi komunis ditangkapi, tanpa mengetahui duduk perkara sebenarnya, ungkap Umi Sardjono, mantan ketua Gerwani, Gerakan Wanita Indonesia.

“Nggak ngerti betul. Malah kita mau bikin pernyataan bela sungkawa atas gugurnya para jenderal. Waktu itu kita malah bagi pekerjaan, urus yang ditangkap supaya dibebaskan. Karena mungkin itu salah paham. Waktu itu sudah mulai ditangkap. Kita nggak ngerti, betul nggak ngerti. Karena merasa nggak bersalah ya nggak lari. Kita dituduh memberi perintah silet-silet, pukul-pukul jenderal. Ya enggak, nggak pernah ada perintah seperti itu.”

Soeharto dan militer pendukungnya terus menggelorakan semangat anti komunis, termasuk melarang lagu Genjer-Genjer. Musik berbahasa Jawa tersebut sebetulnya mengisahkan situasi kemiskinan saat pendudukan Jepang atas Hindia Belanda pada tahun 1942. Genjer merupakan tanaman parasit, karena kelaparan diolah jadi makanan oleh masyarakat. Lagu asal Banyuwangi, Jawa Timur ini digubah seniman Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, sebuah organisasi berideologi komunis.

Saat pergulatan Oktober 1965, lagu Genjer-Genjer oleh kubu pro Soeharto, dipropagandakan macam-macam. Dari plesetan lirik sampai isyu menyebutkan perempuan komunis menganiaya para pimpinan angkatan darat sambil menari telanjang dan menyanyi lagu itu. Cerita-cerita semakin didramatisir, jauh dari fakta, hanya memanas-manasi penduduk supaya ikut dalam operasi pembersihan komunis yang dilakukan tentara.

Truk penuh manusia

Mbah Priyo, salah satu korban selamat dari gelombang pembunuhan massal orang-orang komunis Indonesia. Ia ditangkap pada bulan Oktober 1965 dan dipaksa menunjukan warga kiri lainnya.

“Ada surat panggilan menghadap kantor militer kecamatan. Di sana saya ditanya, berapa kawanmu? saya jawab, hanya saya sendiri. Dada saya sampai ditodong pistol berpeluru. Saya lalu disuruh pamit sama keluarga karena akan dibunuh. Tapi mendadak pistol kembali disarungkan, dan saya diminta naik truk. Katanya tidak lama hanya ditahan tiga hari. Padahal itu sampai enam tahun tidak dipulangkan.”

Priyo dipenjara tanpa melalui proses hukum. Dibui, ia menyaksikan truk penuh membawa manusia untuk dieksekusi.

“Semua yang dipenjara harus di interogasi, dan hasilnya ada tiga macam warna. Merah, putih dan biru. Saya hasilnya merah, itu artinya di bawa ke luweng (gua vertikal) Gunung Kidul, di mana terdapat sungai bawah tanah. Orang dilempar ke situ. Orang mati tidak ketahuan bekasnya. Setiap jam dua pagi ada truk datang. Semua yang ditahan bangun dan cuma bisa menggumam doa supaya tidak dibawa ke luweng. Mbah Priyo sudah dinaikkan. Pasrah. Tapi kemudian disuruh turun karena dianggap ketuaan. Truk itu penuh manusia.”

Yang dilihat Mbah Priyo adalah proses pembunuhan massal di mana sampai sekarang tak pernah ketahuan berapa jumlahnya. Versi tentara setelah pembantaian berlangsung menyebut 78 ribu. Laporan Kopkamtib, satuan pemulihan keamanan bentukan Soeharto, merevisinya dengan mencantumkan angka satu juta manusia. Para peneliti independen melakukan penghitungan silang berbagai data dan mendapatkan total kurang lebih 500 ribu orang. Sayangnya jumlah-jumlah ini sulit mencerminkan kondisi sesungguhnya, termasuk rentetan korban lain seperti pemerkosaan, sakit dibiarkan mati dan mereka yang dibuang ke sungai, laut ataupun ke gua vertikal.

Budayawan kiri Pramoedya Ananta Toer memperkirakan, 500 ribu sampai tiga juta orang binasa.

“Di satu kabupaten Blora, tempat saya, ditemukan 5000 korban. 10 persen dari penduduk dibunuh. Itu baru satu kabupaten. Menurut pers Barat, 500 ribu sampai satu juta orang. Menurut Sudomo -panglima Kopkamtib- 2 juta orang. Menurut Sarwo Edhie, komandan yang melaksanakan program pembunuhan atas perintah Harto, 3 juta! Dia ngomong begitu dengan bangga.”

Jumlah jutaan masuk akal, sebab anggota organisasi-organisasi komunis di Indonesia pada tahun 1960an mencapai 12 juta orang. Anggota partai sendiri tercatat 2 juta orang. Hampir semua korban dieksekusi tanpa proses hukum. Militer membiarkan, bahkan mendorong dan memaksa warga sipil ikut dalam aksi pembunuhan. Albertus Suryo Wicaksono, koordinator peneliti kuburan massal dari organisasi Kasut Perdamaian, menuturkan pola eksekusi di salah satu lokasi di Jawa Tengah.

“Pada akhir tahun 1965, ditempat ini dilakukan eksekusi terhadap 360 orang dilakukan dengan tembakan. Peristiwa berlangsung beberapa hari. Ada petugas yang mencatat. Banyak saksi menyatakan, mereka melihat kehadiran Sarwo Edhie, waktu itu berpangkat kolonel. Malam hari para korban diposisikan berbaris, si pembidik dipandu lampu sorot. Begitu dimatikan penembakan langsung dimulai. Setelah itu langsung dikubur. Jadi gali lubang, ditembak, kemudian dikubur. Begitu seterusnya.”

Pembinasaan dahsyat ini membuat beberapa ahli menjulukinya sebagai genosida terbesar setelah pemusnahan Yahudi dalam perang dunia kedua di Eropa.

Pemakaman layak

Penjelasan atas Gerakan 30 September 1965, yang dianggap pemicu bumi hangus kelompok kiri di Indonesia, tak pernah tuntas. Sejauh mana Partai Komunis terlibat? Sang ketua terlanjur mati sebelum bisa membela diri. DN Aidit di-extrajudicial killing pada bulan November 1965. Pentolan lainnya juga bernasib sama. Sementara Soeharto, memilih membawa rahasia ke liang kubur saat wafat akhir Januari 2008.

Tapi bagi keturunan dan kerabat korban, berapa jumlah sesungguhnya? apakah PKI terlibat atau tidak? bukan tuntutan utama. Permintaan terpenting mereka sederhana: hak untuk memperoleh pemakaman yang layak.

“Saya juga belum tahu apakah betul nanti saya bisa menemukan secara utuh jenazah ayah saya. Tapi apapun juga yang saya dapatkan, biarpun cuma secuil tulang ayah saya, itu juga sudah kebahagiaan. Saya sedih sekaligus senang. Karena bisa membawa pulang, walaupun cuma sepotong tulang ayah saya. Saya bahagia. Meskipun prosesnya harus seperti ini.”

Laporan disusun berdasarkan bahan dari Kantor Berita Radio 68H, Film Pengkhianatan G 30 S PKI, Film dokumenter Mass Grave produksi OffStream dan LSM Kasut Perdamaian.

(In Spanish)

G 30 S PKI: Grupo del 30 de septiembre contra el Partido Comunista de Indonesia. Hasta hoy día estas siglas y números evocan una profunda emoción en gran parte de la población indonesia. La nueva generación piensa que el 30 de septiembre de 1965 los comunistas intentaron derrocar el régimen de Sukarno, y que Suharto es el héroe que salvó el país del “peligro amarillo”.

Pero ¿en qué medida estuvo involucrado el partido comunista en este asunto, y que tramaron detrás de bastidores Suharto y sus compinches? Nunca hubo respuesta clara de los involucrados y nunca la habrá. Por varios motivos. Uno de los protagonistas, Suharto, se llevó el secreto a la tumba. Siguen los interrogantes y los misterios. A los supervivientes y los familiares de las víctimas del G 30 PKI sólo les queda como recurso una petición urgente.

Película falsa

La tortura y el asesinato de los generales es uno de los acontecimientos escalofriantes de la película indonesia “G 30 PKI”, el grupo del 30 de septiembre que entró en acción contra el Partido Comunista de Indonesia. En la escena se ve cómo los cuerpos de los altos mandos militares son mutilados (se les extirpan los ojos y el pene). El filme, basado en los acontecimientos del 30 de septiembre de 1965, era material obligatorio desde 1984 hasta 1998, el año de la caída del ex presidente Suharto. Después de aquella fecha, historiadores y activistas de derechos humanos han publicado un informe demostrando que la película era mentira.

Informes de autopsia indicaban que los cuerpos de los difuntos generales no habían sido mutilados. Otra fuente insiste que no hubo señas de mutilación, sólo de heridas de bala y moretones causados por golpes con la culata del fusil. Tampoco se encontraron pruebas de involucración del ala femenino del partido comunista de Indonesia, Gerwani. Testigos oculares dijeron que no había civiles presentes, sólo militares.

Propaganda anticomunista

Mucho antes de la producción de la película, se difundió la propaganda anticomunista. Como ejemplo, el 4 de octubre de 1965, Suharto pronunció un discurso para convencer a la opinión pública de la culpabilidad del PKI.

“Hemos visto con nuestros propios ojos cómo se sacaron los cuerpos de seis generales y un oficial primero de un pozo de agua. Los generales y el oficial primero son víctimas de una aventura primitiva denominada “el Movimiento del 30 de septiembre”. Este lugar se llama Lubang Buaya, y está cerca de un centro de entrenamiento de voluntarios, miembros de la Juventud del Pueblo, Pemuda Rayat, y el Gerwani”.

Después del discurso del entonces comandante Suharto, el pueblo fue también engañado con otras mentiras sobre los acontecimientos del 30 de septiembre de 1965. El objetivo final de las mentiras era presentar a Suharto como un héroe que salvó el país del golpe de estado comunista.

Represión

Poco después se detuvieron numerosas “personas sospechosas” y se amordazó los medios de orientación izquierdista. Los miembros de organizaciones comunistas fueron detenidos, sin saber qué había pasado, dice Umi Sardjono, ex-presidenta de Gerwani, el movimiento feminista indonesio.

“No entendíamos nada. Queríamos incluso dar nuestro pésame por los generales muertos. No entendíamos que nuestra gente fuera detenida (…) No nos sentíamos culpables, por eso no huíamos. Nos acusaron de haber ordenado mutilar a los generales con cuchillas de afeitar y de golpearles. Pero nunca se dio esa orden.”

Suharto y sus partidarios militares seguían alentando los sentimientos anticomunistas. La canción de Java Genjer-Genjer fue prohibida. El texto habla de la pobreza en los tiempos de la ocupación japonesa de las entonces Indias Neerlandesas en 1942. Genjer es una planta parásita y en aquellos tiempos servía de alimento para la población para matar el hambre. La canción es originaria de Banyuwangi, del este de Java, y fue compuesta por artistas del Instituto de Cultura Popular, de ideología comunista.

En el turbulento mes de octubre de 1965, la camarilla pro Suharto lanzó una campaña de propaganda para desprestigiar la canción Genjer-Genjer. Cambiaron el texto y dispersaron noticias sobre comunistas femeninas que torturaban a los militares, bailando desnudas y cantando la canción. El objetivo era incitar al pueblo a que participara en la acción militar para limpiar el pueblo de los comunistas.

Ejecuciones

El anciano Mbah Privo fue detenido sin ninguna forma de juicio. Los militares lo arrestaron y lo acusaron de ser activista de Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI, una suerte de asociación campesina del Partido Comunista. Pero el BTI solamente llevaba al anciano estiércol como combustible. Cuando estuvo en la cárcel veía pasar camiones llenos de personas para ser ejecutadas.

“Todos los presos eran interrogados y dependiendo del resultado, recibieron un color determinado: rojo, blanco o azul. Yo recibí el color rojo. Eso significaba que me llevarían a una gruta muy profunda, Gunung Kidul, con un río subterráneo. La gente era arrojada a la gruta. Cuando morían no dejaban rastro. Cada madrugada, a las dos, pasaba un camión. Los presos se levantaban y lo único que uno podía hacer es rezar para que no lo llevaran. A mí ya me subían al camión, pero más tarde me bajaron porque era demasiado viejo. El camión estaba repleto”.

Mbah Priyo fue testigo de una masacre del que se desconoce el número exacto de víctimas. Los militares hablan de 78.000 muertos. Bajo Suharto, el número de víctimas fue revisado y determinado en un millón. Sin embargo, el escritor de izquierda Pramoedya Ananta Toer estimaba el número de víctimas entre 500.000 y tres millones.

No sería extraño que el número de víctimas ascienda a millones, porque en los años sesenta, las organizaciones comunistas en Indonesia contaban con 12 millones de miembros. El propio partido PKI tenía 2 millones de afiliados. Casi todas las víctimas fueron ejecutadas inmediatamente.

Mayor exterminio desde el holocausto

Albertus Suryo Wicaksono, coordinador del equipo que investiga la fosa común, comenta que había un esquema especial para las ejecuciones. En una de las localidades en Java Central se fusilaron a finales de 1965 a 360 personas.

“Las ejecuciones duraban unos días. Una persona las anotaba (…) Las víctimas eran enterradas inmediatamente. La propia persona a fusilar tenía que cavar su fosa, lo fusilaban y se lo cubría con tierra… así continuaban”. Hay expertos que califican esta masacre del peor genocidio después del exterminio de los judíos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial.Pero para los familiares de las víctimas lo más importante no es conocer el número de víctimas o la involucración o no del Partido Comunista. Lo más importante es tener el derecho a unos funerales dignos. Muchos se conformarían con tener un trozo de hueso, para poder enterrarlo.

Image Source: militaryphotos.net

By Evan A. Laksmana

The Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrated its 63rd anniversary on Oct. 5. Its formal commemoration, however, will be held on Oct. 14 because the original date was too close with Idul Fitri, which fell on Oct. 1.

Sixty-three years after its inception and ten years after the birth of the reform order, the complex challenge of repositioning the military in Indonesia’s democratic setting and building a professional military to tackle the changing security environment remains.

On the domestic front, several contentious issues seem unsettled, including past abuses of military force, despite significant and commendable progress in internal reforms. Meanwhile, the traditional challenge of fighting a conventional war is compounded by an array of modern security issues such as terrorism, disaster relief and illegal fishing.

Richard D. Kohn, a professor at the University of North Carolina, contends that creating a strategic and professional military means dealing with three challenges: the intellectual, political and moral.

The intellectual challenge deals with how to prepare the military to operate successfully in a variety of security environments. For the TNI, this would amount to providing the intellectual foundation for officers to be repositioned.

Despite commendable legal efforts to do so, the intellectual challenge of tackling traditional and modern security challenges in a democratic setting enables us to reconstruct the mind-set of the officer corps by reconsidering the military education and training system along with the military’s basic doctrine.

The former might involve a revamp of previous curricula and teaching methods, since the legacy of the old system preparing officers to play a sociopolitical role, under the now-defunct dual function doctrine, might still linger.

For example, we could consider increasing and refining core military subjects, such as geopolitics and modern warfare, while further improving existing key nonmilitary subjects, such as history, humanitarian law and international relations.

This would not only lay a stronger intellectual foundation for officers by exposing them to critical thinking, but it could also pave the way to civilianize the teaching staff as the courses could be taught by numerous qualified civilian instructors. Plus, more officers could be sent abroad for further education to expose them to other militaries, providing them with a broader strategic perspective.

Although the TNI’s external defense role is legally prescribed, given the low military budget and domestic economic problems, efforts to assist the people is commendable. After all, the devil gives work to idle hands, as the old saying goes.

However, given history, where such “civic missions” were misused by president Soeharto for his own political purposes, a continued persistence on domestic operations might raise concern about possible excesses in the future.

One often overlooked external mission might be considered to help downplay the problem of “idle capacity”, namely international peacekeeping operations. Not only is the TNI’s track record excellent in this regard, but such operations have the potential to replace domestic operations as a key consideration in career promotions while boosting Indonesia’s international image.

However, a modification of the military’s basic doctrine of Total People’s Defense — born from Indonesia’s guerrilla warfare against the Dutch in the 1940s — might be needed to complement any education and training efforts.

One could argue that an archaic formula assuming the TNI to be underdeveloped to face an external attack, and therefore needs to “prepare” the people for guerrilla warfare, could hamper the dynamic and critical thinking necessary to tackle more complicated security challenges, especially in the realm of modern security.

Meanwhile, the political challenge is the military’s political neutrality and subordination to the legally constituted civilian authority. Considering Indonesia’s turbulent civilian-military relationship, this challenge is perhaps the least clear cut.

Thus, a civilian defense community is needed to create a triangular balance and achieve the so-called concordance civil-military relations where the government, officer corps and civil society have a cooperative relationship stressing dialogue, accommodation and shared values.

This could be done through several steps.

First, the government could reduce suspicion and grievances within the officer corps by not politicizing the military, especially on the eve of next year’s elections, and by not interfering excessively in internal military affairs.

Second, the military could maintain the trust extended by the political leadership by continuing the momentum of military reform.

Finally, the moral challenge addresses the internal honor and integrity of the officer corps.

Polls have shown that the military’s public image has significantly improved over the past decade, largely due to perceived civilian corruption and political bickering. However, the recent spat between the National Commission for Human Rights and retired officers regarding investigation into past human rights abuses by the military suggests that a perceived “culture of impunity” might become a “pebble in the shoe” for the military’s public image.

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The writer is a research analyst at the Indonesia Programme at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article was published by the Jakarta Post.

Image Source: gio.gov.tw

In order to avoid inaccurate perceptions regarding the internal reform of the Indonesian Military (TNI), the answer to the article, “Indonesian Military returns to politics?” by Evan A. Laksmana (The Jakarta Post, Aug. 12), is the TNI will not be back in politics.

The TNI of today functions as the state defense apparatus and is not involved in security and socio-political activities as was the former Indonesian armed forces. It continues to maintain its relationships and emotional ties with its seniors — individually as well as through the retired servicemen’s association — but without organizational linkages.

If the TNI’s retirees are involved in politics as political party executives or as candidates for president/vice president, legislators or regional heads, it is because they are Indonesian citizens, and therefore have the same rights as their fellow countrymen. Their success in entering political affairs depends on the Indonesian people, not on the TNI institution or their former military service.

The TNI’s duties are to safeguard the state’s sovereignty, maintain the integrity and unity of the Republic of Indonesia and protect the country. This requires the TNI to have political awareness while observing restrictions stipulated by law. It is impossible for the TNI to execute its duty properly without understanding the vision, struggle and interests of the nation.

The TNI no longer operates with a territorial command structure because in 2002 it was changed to regional command and, obviously, now has no direct involvement in the social, political and business affairs in their areas of operation. In addition to warfare knowledge, soldiers’ socio-political knowledge relevant to military operations is required by law.

SAGOM TAMBOEN S. IP
Vice Marshal
TNI Chief Spokesman
Jakarta

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This letter was published on Jakarta Post

Image Source: picasaweb.google.com

By Evan A. Laksmana

In the past few weeks, a debate surrounding the 2009 general elections has revolved around the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in political parties where almost every major political party has former military officers sitting as board members or as chairman.

For example, the Golkar Party is now spearheaded by Vice President Jusuf Kalla as chairman and Lt. Gen. (ret) Sumarsono as secretary-general, while former military officers are filling the Hanura and Gerindra party leadership under retired generals Wiranto and Prabowo, respectively.

In addition, this military “comeback” coincides with the growing trend of former military men contesting local elections. Marcus Mietzner, a lecturer at the Australian National University, found that in 2006, 8 percent of the candidates contesting 50 local polls were retired military and police officers.

This begs the question: Is the Indonesian Military returning to politics? Although officially banned from day-to-day politics, the military has always been considered Indonesia’s most powerful political institution by virtue of its institutional strength, especially its territorial command structure.

In this regard, it might not be a question of whether the military has returned to politics, but a question of how it plays politics under the new rules of the game. In other words, one could argue it never actually left the political scene.

If this is the case, what then explains the phenomenon of an apparent military “comeback” in politics?

First, as argued by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a professor at the National Institute of Sciences, it might be an indication of a post-power syndrome among officers who were once part of the ruling elite — or it might only involve a handful of high-ranking former officers rather than indicate a general trend plaguing the entire officer corps.

Second, it could also be seen as the result of politicization, and even commercialization, of the officer corps, which is instigated not only by the political leadership’s intervention in internal military affairs — as was the case during the terms of presidents Sukarno, Soeharto, and Abdurrahman Wahid — but also due to the nature of the military education and its territorial command system.

The fact that the majority of the Army is utilized for staff positions in the territorial command structure suggests that the career experience of the majority of the officer corps is actually related to social, business, and political issues in the regions.

Although the process of military education reform is currently underway, the curricula at the military academies all the way through the staff and command colleges since the 1960s have always emphasized social-political subjects. This suggests that some, if not most, military officers would be prepared for “sociopolitical” tasks, and hence, by implication, might not be well trained in other skills required for an alternative livelihood after retirement other than politics or business.

Finally, the military prevalence in politics highlights the failure of the civilian leadership — whether to provide stability and improve welfare, or to overcome their lack of political confidence — because they continue to drag the military back in.

On the one hand, we hear the oft-repeated accusation from the military establishment that the civilian politicians are a prime source of the nation’s problems — which the public seems to agree with. A Kompas poll in 2007 noted that 46.6 percent of the public would vote for a military figure as the next president. On the other hand, the charge might not have credibility had it not been for the fact that corruption among civilian politicians is increasing while basic prices are skyrocketing.

Meanwhile, the “inferiority syndrome” suffered by civilian politicians highlights two points: First, the weakness of the civilian defense community to adequately support the civilian leadership; and second, the cliche that military men are financially and politically omnipotent — regardless of the current debate challenging the leadership skills possessed by former military officers.

What does all this mean for Indonesia’s fledgling military reform and delicate civilian-military relations?

First, although the focus on removing the military from day-to-day politics and regulating their commercial activities is certainly a worthy cause, the issue of military education reform should be the top priority of decision makers in Jakarta.

Without a complete overhaul and integration of the military curricula — as well as a civilian teaching staff — military officers will always reserve the potential to play a sociopolitical role.

Second, although the territorial command structure cannot be plausibly erased entirely due to the prevalence of internal security threats and separatism, a mechanism should be enforced within the existing regulations to “isolate” military men assigned to regional staff positions to prevent them from being utilized or dragged into local social, political and business activities.

When it comes to civilian-military relations, observers have noted this “comeback” phenomenon could be seen positively as far as military politics are concerned because with former generals running their own campaigns, the military might not be able to present a unified front. Hence, as the argument goes, civilian leadership could be strengthened at the expense of a “fractured” military establishment.

However, a strong civilian leadership cannot be fully achieved without the strengthening of a civilian defense community that could bridge the civilian-military divide while assisting both sides in dealing with national security issues. At the same time, the civilian leadership also needs to overcome its “inferiority syndrome” and stop bringing the military back into politics.

Finally, public exhaustion over corrupt civilian politicians might lead to disillusionment with democratic ideals and civilian supremacy over the military — premised upon distinct “civilian” and “military” realms.

Eventually, if this dichotomy is increasingly blurred, a reconsideration of civilian-military relations that for the past decade has been centered upon establishing a civilian supremacy over the military might be required.

In the end, whether a civilian-military “partnership” would be the best form of relationship and whether such partnership would prove more productive for Indonesia’s future in the long run remains to be seen.

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The writer is a research analyst at the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article was publish by The Jakarta Post.

Seminar Memperingati 10 Tahun Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998 di Amerika Utara dilakukan di delapan kota utama, yaitu San Francisco, San Leandro, Sacramento, Los Angeles Area, Atlanta, Dallas, Washington DC dan Toronto yang dimulai dari tanggal 10 Mei 2008 hingga 25 Mei 2008. Dengan diprakarsai oleh Media Indonesia, dan berkoalisi dengan organisasi Human Rights di Amerika Utara menampilkan Drs. Eddie Lembong, Founding Chairman Yayasan Nation Building (Nabil) sebagai pembicara utama. Beberapa organisasi di kota tertentu menampilkan topik “Menuju Undonesia Baru Tanpa Kekerasan dan Diskriminasi.”

Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia (OTTI) – Mutiara Andalas SJ dan Dr. Beni Bevly bekerja sama dengan Indonesia Media — Arnold Lukito dan Dr. Irawan, Indonesian Chinese American Network (ICANet) — Peter Phwan, Chinese Community of San Leandro (CCSL) — Hendy Wijaya, Bolaang Mongondow – Sangihe Talaud – Minahasa (BOSAMI) — Tony Lolong, Jakarta Butuh Revolusi Budaya (JBRB) — Tasa Nugraza Barley, MBA dan para individu yang terdiri dari Herning Grissom, Laura Lumenta, Surya Sitanggang, Hock Chuan dan Susanne Setijadi menggelar seminar dan renungan ini di Sacramento, San Leandro, dan San Francisco.

Topik Presentasi

Berikut adalah topik presentasi yang dibawakan oleh masing-masing pembicara:

Drs. Eddie Lembong. Sebagai ketua Yayasan Nabil, ia menampilkan pendekatan sejarah dalam membahas Tragedi Mei 1998. Ia membahas sejarah Indonesia masa lalu, keadaan masa kini dan prospek masa depan dalam kaitannya dengan posisi etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia. Salah satu paper dari Drs. Eddie Lembong yang berjudul “Mengenang Tragedi Mei 1998, Memahami Masa Kini, dan Merancang Hari Depan yang Lebih Baik” bisa diakses dengan mengklik Mengenang Tragedi Mei 1998.

H. Yudhistiranto Sungadi. Sungadi pada saat ini menjabat sebagai Konsul Jenderal Republik Indonesia San Francisco. Pembahasannya menitik beratkan pada perkembangan Indonesia paska Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998. Semenjak tragedy yang membawa Indonesia ke titik terendah dalam hampir setiap bidang, telah banyak kemajuaan yang dicapai oleh pemerintahan Indonesia. Secara khusus ia menampilkan kemajuan dalam bidang hak asasi manusia dan menjamin kebebasan etnis Tionghoa untuk berekspresi termasuk mengekpresikan budaya Tionghoa. Dalam bidang politik, pemerintah telah menciptakan iklim yang kondusif bagi etnis Tinghoa untuk berperan, di antaranya dengan diberlakukannya UU Kewarga-Negaraan yang baru. Di akhir presentasinya, Sungadi memberikan beberapa masukan bagaimana supaya antar etnis di Indonesia bisa hidup berdampingan secara damai.

Dr. Muhamad Ali. Ali yang mengajar di Religious Studies Department di UC Riverside dan juga penulis buku “Teologi Pluralisme Multikultural” menampilkan topic “Dari Kekerasan Menuju Kedamaian.” Ia memulai pembahasannya dengan melihat pola kerusuhan massa di Indonesia, lalu ia masuk dalam topik kekerasan, secara spesifik melihat hal-hal yang menyebabkan terjadinya kekerasan termasuk Tragedy Mei 1998, dan bagaimana strategi mengatasi kekerasan. Poin-poin yang dikemukan Ali bisa ditemukan dengan cara mengklik Dari Kekerasan Menuju Damai.

Mutiara Andalas, SJ. Romo Andy, begitu panggilan akrabnya, adalah pendamping para korban Tragedy Kemanusiaan Mei 1998 di Indonesia. Selain itu, ia juga analist dari Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia dan penulis buku “Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan”. Ia sangat dekat dan merasakan secara langsung penderitaan para korban dan keluarga korban. Pembahasannya menempat manusia sebagai manusia seutuhnya. Seperti judul bukunya, papernya pun mempunyai judul yang serupa, yaitu “Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan” menggambarkan bagaimana pengalaman pribadinya berjumpa dengan mayat-mayat korban yang terbakar hangus, bagaimana peranan negara yang secara sistematis memojokkan para korban dan para aktivis sehingga masyarakat awam dan bahkan kaum religius agaknya secara tidak sadar ikut menyalahkan para korban dan melupakan tragedi kemanusiaan ini begitu saja, tanpa ada jalan keluar yang adil. Untuk membaca paper Romo Andy lebih jauh bisa diklik Kesucian Politik

Dr. Beni Bevly. Bevly dikenal sebagai aktivis intelektual alumnus Jurusan Ilmu Politik Universitas Indonesia. Ia adalah pendiri Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia, lingkar studi tantang Indonesia. Penulis buku “Aku Orang Cina? Narasi Pemikiran Politik Plus dari Seorang Tionghoa” ini menampilkan paper yang berjudul “Memperingati 10 Tahun Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998: Mengerti Masa Lalu dan Kini untuk Meniti Masa Depan yang Damai”. Paper ini disusun atas permintaan koordinator “Prayer for Human Right in Indonesia” berdasarkan kerangka presentasi Drs. Eddie Lembong, ketua Nabil pada “Seminar Menuju Indonesia Baru” di San Leandro, CA tanggal 11 Mei 2008 seperti dijelaskan di atas. Paper tersebut bisa diakses dengan mengklik Memperingati 10 Tahun Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998

Di bawah adalah laporan singkat kegiatan seminar memperingati 10 Tahun Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998 di Sacramento, San Leandro dan San Francisco.

Sacramento

Seminar dan Renungan di Sacramento difasilitasi oleh Herning Grissom pada Tanggal 10 Mei 2008 menampilan:

Dr. Muhamad Ali dari Religious (Pengajar di Studies Department, University of California Riverside, Penulis buku “Teologi Pluralisme Multikultural”)

Mutiara Andalas, SJ (Rohaniawan, penulis buku “Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan”)

Mediator, Dr. Aart van Beek (Counseling Training Director, penulis buku “Life in Javanese Kraton”dan “Cross Cultural Counseling”)

Moderator, Dr. Beni Bevly (Analist dari Overseas Think tank for Indonesia, penulis buku “Aku Orang Cina? Narasi Pemikiran Politik Plus dari Seorang Tionghoa”).

Seminar dan renungan ini dihadiri eleh sekitar 40 peserta yang terdiri dari beragam etnis Indonesia dan Amerika.

Suasana ramah-tamah sebelum acara dimulai. Terlihat pameran foto di latar belakang peserta.

Sambutan dari tuan rumah, Herning Grissom (kanan). Dari kiri adalah pembicara Dr. Muhamad Ali dan Mutiara Andalas, SJ beserta moderator Dr. Beni Bevly. Terlihat sebagian buku yang berkaitan dengan Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998 didisplay (kanan bawah).

Dr. Aart van Beek sebagai mediator memberikan pandangan empiris dan netral.

Vigil sebagai penutup seminar dan renungan.

San Leandro

Pada tanggal 11 Mei 2008, bertempat di San Leandro, dihadirkan:

Drs. Eddie Lembong (Founding Chairman of Yayasan Nation Building/NABIL, Indonesia)

H. Yudhistiranto Sungadi (Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia San Francisco)

Dr. Muhamad Ali dari Religious (Pengajar di Studies Department, University of California Riverside, Penulis buku “Teologi Pluralisme Multikultural”)

Mutiara Andalas, SJ (Rohaniawan, penulis buku “Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan”)

Moderator, Dr. Beni Bevly (Analist dari Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia, penulis buku “Aku Orang Cina? Narasi Pemikiran Politik Plus dari Seorang Tionghoa”).

Para pembicara dari kiri Dr. Muhamad Ali, Drs. Addie Lembong, Dr. Beni Bevly (moderator), H. Yudhistiranto Sungadi dan Mutiara Andalas, SJ.

Lebih dari 160 peserta di San Leandro mengikuti seminar secara seksama.

Penyerahan Petisi Menuju Indonesia Baru kepada Konsul Jenderal RI San Francisco, H. Yudhistiranto Sungadi.

Wartawan dari Bay Area San Francisco (kanan) meliput kegiatan di San Leandro.

San Francisco

Bertempat di San Francisco, Forum Komunikasi Gereja-Gereja Indonesia di Bay Area mengadakan “Prayer for Human Right in Indonesia” pada tanggal 17 Mei 2008 dengan menampilkan pembicara Dr. Beni Bevly.

Renungan dan doa dipimpin oleh Tony Lolong, Pdt. Matthew Wakkary, Pdt. Fenina Mundisugih (Afen), Pdt. Johanes Sudarma, Pdt. Sugi Hendric, Pdt. Solaiman Ishak, Pdt. Edwin Katuk, Pdt. Hengki Suryantio dan Tony Bastaman.

Sambutan dari Tony Lolong di FKGI.

Renungan dan doa bersama untuk perdamaian di Idonesia.

Dr. Beni Bevly membahas tragedy kemanusiaan dari pendekatan historis.

Doa bersama yang dipimpin oleh setiap pendeta secara bergiliran.

Liputan dari The Argus

Surat kabar, The Argus meliput kegiatan Peringatan Tragedi Kemanusiaan Mei 1998 di Bay Area San Francisco. Harian ini menempatkan laporkan kegiatan ini di halaman depan.

Liputan di front page surat kabar “the Argus”

Background

“Around 11:30am, I saw several people of a large crowd hijacked a car and forced the passengers to come out of the car. They pulled two women out of the car and stripped them naked. They gang raped them. Those two girls tried to fight while shouting with fear, but failed,” said an eyewitness in Muara Angke, Jakarta on May 14, 1998.

Almost 100 Indonesian females of Chinese ethnicity suffered from sexual abuse and 1,339 Indonesians died during the tragedy of humanity May 13-15, 1998. Many deaths occurred in malls set on fire by the mobilized crowd. Shooting of four Trisakti University students occurred prior. The afternoon cloud of Jakarta went dark and the midnight sky went bright flaming red due to fires set ablazed. There were 5,723 properties, 1,948 private vehicles, and 516 public transportations costing inconceivable amount of casualties had resulted. Similar incidents also occurred in other cities simultaneously, such as Surabaya, Palembang, Solo, and Lampung (Jusuf, Timbul, Gultom & Frishka, 2007).

After ten years of May 1998 tragedy, we can still listen to cries from victims’ families, “My heart is hurt. My life doesn’t mean anything, void. Until the end of time, I won’t forget how such inhumane incident that has cost my son’s life. He was accused as a rioter, but he was actually a victim. Where can I ask for justice? Why did it happen?”

Such violence and discrimination incidents like May 1998 Tragedy of Humanity had occurred in Indonesia for more than 300 years. In 1740, Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) under General Governor Adriaan Valckenier has massacred 10,000 people of Chinese ethnicity in Batavia (read: Batavia was the former name of Jakarta) (Setiono, 2003).

On October 31, 1918, as the result of divide at impera imperialism political strategy by the Dutch, properties belong to people of Chinese ethnicity in Kudus were mobbed and set on fire by thousands of mobilized crowds from Mayong, Jepara, Pati, Demak, and vicinity. Hundreds of people of Chinese ethnicity were injured and 16 died.

When the Dutch lost in World War II, they destructed, looted, and destroyed a massive number of houses, shops, and hundreds of factories belong to people of Chinese ethnicity in Indonesia. Many people used the Dutch’s derogatory behaviors as examples at that moment and at a later date.

The Japanese colonized Indonesia after the Dutch’s failure. They also performed violence and discrimination. They created strong divide between Indonesian natives and the minorities. One of the massacres occurred in October 1943 was known as “Pontianak Affair,” in which 1,500 people were killed, of which 854 were of Chinese ethnicity (Purdey, 2006).

With the Japanese retreated from Indonesia, the Dutch returned as NICA soldiers (Nederlandsch Indie Civil Administration). They succeeded in their divide-and-conquer efforts. In May 1946, there were 635 Chinese people killed and some of them burnt alive, including 136 women and children in Tangerang, which is located a few kilometers west of Jakarta, and vicinity. One thousand two hundred and sixty eight houses were burned and 236 were destructed (Setiono, 2006a).

Following those incidents were more massacres, lootings, and burnings of properties, shops, factories, and vehicles in Bagan Siapi-Api, Kuningan, Majalengka, Indramayu, Pekalongan, Tegal, Purwokerto, Purbalingga, Bobotsari, Gombong, Lumajang, Jember, Malang, Lawang, Singosari, and other regions.

After Indonesia’s independence, many more violent and discrimination-based incidents kept occurring. On May 10, 1963, anarchic incidents occurred again. Started with a motorcycle bumping into a college student, provoked crowd immediately looted, destructed, and burned properties and automobiles in Bandung, which later spread to neighboring regions, such as Tasikmalaya, Garut, Cianjur, and Sukabumi.

Military operation against those who were accused, of which many of them were wrongfully, of being involved in G30S (30 September Movement) was started in 1965. Such operation had resulted in deaths millions of men and women of all ages, minorities and majorities, Muslim and non-Muslim. Millions of deaths without any fair trial. In 1967, with objective of eradicating Serawak People Guerilla Troop (Pasukan Gerilyawan Rakyat Serawak PGRS), the crowd was mobilized again to massacre the villagers of West Kalimantan, of which many of them were of Chinese ethnicity. Tens of thousands of people sought refuge in Singkawang and Pontianak.

On January 15, 1974, a protest occurred that later was known as Malari Incident started a series of lootings, burnings, and attacks toward shops and shop owners who were of Chinese ethnicity in Pasar Senen and Blok M areas, Jakarta.

We can also recall how we have noted the numerous victims of violence, who were our brothers and sisters, in the Mysterious Shootings in Tanjung Priok 1984, Talangsari 1989, and Activist Kidnappings 1997-1998.

Prior to the retrieval of Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) in Timor Leste by the end of 1999, mass killings, burnings, destructions, and lootings occurred. During the conflict period and TNI colonization, 125,000 Timor Leste residents were killed (Vickers, 2007).

More incidents of violence and discrimination in large or small scales, both locally and nationally, based on ethnicity and religion, political and non-political, as those previous occurrences have the potential to happen again in the future if we allow those believers in violence and discrimination to perform the gross violence against humanity.

Such incidents of violence and discrimination were orchestrated as vehicles in the tug-of-war of power among those who are power hungry. For such political goal, they utilized divide-and-conquer strategy by exploiting ethnicity, religion, race, and cultural sentiments. As a strong supporter of new Indonesia without violence, we must end such actions of gross violations against humanity.

Our ancestors have lived their lives marked with incidents of violence and discrimination, while long prior to that they had lived in harmony with people of other races and had chosen to live in Nusantara, the land prior to Indonesia’s independence. All of us long to live together in harmony and peacefully for the unity of our people.

Almost a thousand of years ago, people of Chinese ethnicity have taught many indigenous people in the pre-independence Indonesia to make bricks and roof tiles for their houses. Living together in harmony side-by-side had also allowed the transfer of all kinds of knowledge, such as how to use needle, make clothings, and plant food crops to occur seamlessly (Adam, 2002).

In togetherness, we also fostered collaborations with external sources, such as with China, to build war ships and assemble gunpowder technology. Because of such collaborations, Indonesian ancestors were able to unite pre-independence Indonesia under the ruling of Majapahit Kingdom.

With collaborations with Cheng Ho Admiral and some of Wali Songo, who were Islamic leaders of China origin, Islam set foot in pre-independence Indonesia. By the same token, Wali Songo, among which include Sunan Bonang (Bong Ang), Sunan Kalijaga (Gan Si Cang), Sunan Ampel (Bong Swi Hoo), and Sunan Jati (Toh A Bo), established the first Islamic kingdom in Demak. The first sultan Raden Patah was also known as Jin Bun or Cek Ko Po (Qurtuby, 2003).

Harmonious collaborations between “indigenous” Indonesians and people of Chinese ethnicity have resulted in winning the independence war against the Dutch, which was evident in the Java War (1825-1830). In that war, Tan Djin Sing actively helped Prince of Diponegoro by contributing in the forms of expenses, horses, and training the members of the troop with martial arts (Setiono, 2006b).

Those who had gone before us had set an example of harmonious living in light of unifying modern Indonesia under the slogan “One Nation, One People, and One Language” on October 28, 1928. Sin Po newspaper was the first publication that published Indonesia Raya national anthem and helped with propaganda for using “Indonesia” as a term that substituted “Hindia Belanda,” which was the official name during Dutch colonization. Kwee Thiam Hong (Daud Budiman), Ong Khai Siang, Jong Liaw Thoan Hok, Thio Jin Kwee, and Muhammad Chai were involved in Sumpah Pemud, which was a national plead for unity (Wijayakusuma, 1999).

Liem Koen Hian, Oei Tjong Hauw, Oei Tiang Tjoei, and Tan Eng Hoa were also actively involved in the drafting of Indonesia’s Fundamental Laws (Undang-Undang Dasar RI) in 1945 (Suryadinata, 2005).

The long struggle of the Republic of Indonesia to this very day has been the result of harmonious collaborations of those who call themselves “indigenous” Indonesians and people of Chinese ethnicity. Therefore, whoever lives in Indonesia or become Indonesian citizen regardless of their ethnicities and origins have the fundamental rights to receive humane treatments, without violence and discrimination whatsoever.

In the 10th anniversary of May 1998 tragedy of humanity, we urge the government of the Republic of Indonesia to thoroughly investigate the series of atrocities in May 1998 that occurred throughout Indonesia, and to bring the perpetrators to justice without any exception or reservation.

We urge the government of the Republic of Indonesia to lawfully bring to justice any individual(s) and/or group(s) that have been exploiting the issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and culture toward victims of violence and discrimination.

We invite all citizens of Indonesia and citizens of the world to take part and show solidarity in light of establishing a new Indonesia without any violence and discrimination.

Name of Activity

We call this activity of commemorating the 10th year of May 1998 Tragedy of Humanity as “Worldwide Vigil for Humanity.”

Objectives

This Worldwide Vigil for Humanity has three objectives:

Fisrst, to urge the government of the Republic of Indonesia to fully investigate the May 1998 Tragedy of Humanity and to bring the perpetrators to justice without any exception or reservation.

Second, to urge the government of the Republic of Indonesia to enforce the laws and bring to justice individual(s) and/or group(s) that exploit ethnicity, religion, race, and culture toward victims of violence and discrimination.

Third, to invite all citizens of Indonesia and citizens of the world in establishing new Indonesia without violence and discrimination.

Executor and Originator

The people behind this activity or executors are those individuals and organizations that support the goals of this action and sign the petition “Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” as set forth on PeacefulIndonesia.com (http://www.peacefulindonesia.com/petition/).

The originator of this activity is Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia (OTTI) (http://www.overseasthinktankforindonesia.com), an informal study group focusing on Indonesia issues from the perspective of activist-scholar of humanity based in California, the United States.

Scope, Timeframe, and Place of Activities

The scope, timeframe, and place of activities of Worldwide Vigil for Humanity comprise of signing the petition and becoming the doers or executors for the activity, disseminating information on activities, conducting the worldwide vigil of humanity followed by oration, conducting seminar or discussion, and delivering the petition.

First, we urge you to support and become a part of this human rights activism by joining the “Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” petition, which can be done through Peaceful Indonesia Web Site by clicking “Sign the Petition” (http://www.peacefulindonesia.com/petition/) between March 24 to May 1, 2008.

Second, we urge you to install Worldwide Vigil of 10 Years for Humanity Tragedy in May 1998 banner on your blog or web site. You will be able to download the banners of your choices by clicking “Banners” (http://www.peacefulindonesia.com/banners/) on Peaceful Indonesia web site.

Third, we urge you to send in plans and execution of activities in commemorating 10 years of May 1998 Humanity Tragedy in forms of text/article, graphic and or video/film to Peaceful Indonesia web site with attention to peacefulindonesia[at]gmail.com.

Fourth, we urge you to conduct Worldwide Vigil for Humanity by enunciating the “Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” petition (as attached) followed by oration between May 13-15, 2008 worldwide or at wherever you conduct your activity.

Fifth, we urge you to conduct seminar or discussion on “Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” in May 1998.

Sixth, we will deliver the petition to the President of Republic of Indonesia and carbon copy it to all institutions, organizations and individuals related to May 1998 Humanity Tragedy in Indonesia and overseas by May 10, 2008.

We invite and urge you as concerned citizens of the world to act individually or within groups or organizations, which is symbolized by signing “Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” petition.

Closing

We hope that all concerned citizens of Indonesia and citizens of the world, who are moved heartily and mindfully to urge the government of the Republic of Indonesia to thoroughly investigate and bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, include May 1998 Humanity Tragedy and to re-create a new Indonesia without violence and discrimination.

We urge all concerned citizens of Indonesia and citizens of the world to visit PeacefulIndonesia.com (http://www.peacefulindonesia.com) and sign the petition page.

For further information, please contact Mutiara Andalas, SJ and Dr. Beni Bevly at peacefulindonesia[at]gmail.com.

Faithfully yours,

Mutiara Andalas, SJ dan Dr. Beni Bevly
Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia
Berkeley, Friday, Maret 41, 2008

References

Adam, A. W. (2002, 12 Februari). Cina Absen Dalam Pelajaran Sejarah. Koran Tempo.

Jusuf, E.I., Timbul, H., Gultom, O., & Frishka. (2007). Kerusuhan Mei 1998, Fakta, Data & Analisa. Jakarta, Indonesia: SNB, APHI dan TIFA.

Purdey, J. (2006). Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press.

Qurtuby, S.A. (2003). Arus Cina-Islam-Jawa. Jakarta, Indonesia: Inspeal Ahimsakarya Press.

Setiono, G. (2003).Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik. Jakarta, Indonesia: ELKASA.

Setiono, G. (2006a, Mei). Peristiwa 13-15 Mai 1998 Puncak Kekerasan Anti Tionghoa di Indonesia. Makalah dalam rangka seminar di ICAA, Los Angeles, 13 Mei 2006 dan ICANet, San Francisco, 14 Mei 2006.

Setiono, G. (2006b, Mei). Tionghoa di Indonesia. Makalah dalam rangka seminar di Sebring Group di Toronto, Canada, 20 Mei 2006.

Suryadinata, L. (2005). Pemikiran Politik Etnis Tionghoa Indonesia 1900-2002. Jakarta, Indonesia: INTI-LP3ES.

Vickers, A. (2007). A History of Modern Indonesia. New York, NY: Cambrige University Press.

Wijayakusuma, H. (1999, Mei). Warga Tionghoa Juga Anak Bangsa. Tabloid Suar 168. minggu ketiga.

Attachment
Proposal of Worldwide Vigil
10th Year Commemoration of May 1998 Tragedy

“Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination” petition

“Around 11:30am, I saw several people of a large crowd hijacked a car and forced the passengers to come out of the car. They pulled two women out of the car and stripped them naked. They gang raped them. Those two girls tried to fight while shouting with fear, but failed,” said an eyewitness in Muara Angke, Jakarta on May 14, 1998.

“My heart is hurt. My life doesn’t mean anything, void. Until the end of time, I won’t forget how such inhumane incident that has cost my son’s life. He was accused as a rioter, but he was actually a victim. Where can I ask for justice? Why did it happen?” said a mother of a victim in May 1998 Humanity Tragedy.

Ninety two Indonesian females of Chinese ethnicity were sexually abused, 1,338 were killed, and unaccounted private and public properties were destroyed in May 1998 Tragedy that occurred in Jakarta, Surabaya, Palembang, Solo, and Lampung.

Incidents of violence and discrimination have occurred in Indonesia for more than 300 years. In 1740, more than 10,000 people of Chinese ethnicity were massacred and the females sexually abused by Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) under the ruling of General Governor Adriaan Valckenier

On October 31, 1918, as the result of divide-and-conquer Dutch colonial political strategy, thousands of mobilized crowd from Mayong, Jepara, Pati, Demak, and others destructed shops and housings of those belong to people of Chinese ethnicity in Kudus. Hundreds of people were injured and 16 of them were killed.

The colonial political strategies involving mobilized crowd to perform orchestrated violence toward minority groups, who have been scapegoated as “threats,” have been adopted by post-independence regime(s). The politics of scapegoating a particular minority group, such as G30S, for instance, had caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands to millions of men and women, minorities and majorities, Muslims and non-Muslims.

Incidents of violence and discrimination in various scales have occurred due to ethnicity, religion, racial, and cultural issues. Eruptions of violence have the potential to re-emerge in the future if we allow perpetrators of gross violators of crimes against humanity to walk free from justice and if we refuse to empathize with the victims and survivors.

Those who had gone before us have pioneered a pluralistic Indonesia that comprises of various ethnicities, religions, races, and cultures. They have worked together hand-in-hand in defending themselves against all kinds of inhumane and derogatory treatments in the forms of colonization, violence, racial discrimination, and others. They have taken oath that we are all one nation, one people, and one language. Indonesia.

In this 10th year commemoration of May 1998 Tragedy, we urge the government of Republic of Indonesia to fully investigate May 1998 Tragedy and bring the perpetrators to justice.

We urge the government of Republic of Indonesia to prosecute to the fullest extend of the law any individual(s) or group(s) that exploit the issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and culture to the victims.

We urge all concerned citizens of Indonesia and concerned citizens of the world to show solidarity to Indonesian people and victims of crimes against humanity in light of creating a new Indonesia without violence and discrimination.[]